There are several primary barriers and legal restrictions to comprehensive integration facing the national intelligence community. A number of them are reviewed in this paper.
Ineffective sharing of information
Law enforcement groups have been facing challenges in how they work together and share vitally important information. According to the reviews conducted during the 2011aftermath, it was discovered the inability of the United States’ law enforcement groups to access significant data collectively upheld by the enforced law of the American community is a leading vulnerability. The law enforcement agencies have been denied the capability to use the information already within their possession, which would significantly decrease the risk of terrorist attacks and enhance the security and safety in the American communities. On the other hand, there is a lack of knowledge among law enforcement participants regarding network-based information sharing systems. Without this system, the efficiency and effectiveness of the local law enforcement groups will proceed to be unnecessarily limited. In this case, the federal agencies will be unable to make use of the information collectively maintained by the law enforcement communities. Besides, the American law enforcement agencies continue being incapable of developing in spite of the availability of numerous reliable local efforts as well as millions of money used in federal funding. They have no knowledge regarding the information presented in their collective possession. In this case, there are records of criminal felons, murderers, rapists, drug traffickers, or possible terrorists, are lawfully upheld in the records of police and sheriff’s departments in the United States.
This is a primary barrier whereby all technical and human procedures and the American analytical capabilities require replacement or repair. Various institutions and systems were created, like the Soviet Union, to slowly examine evolving massive targets. The dispersed, as well as the episode nature of the current threats, needs much more accurate and constant monitoring. Normally, recruiting detectives against their main adversary seemed difficult given the clogged nature of communist states. Problems like social insecurity of failed governments, disintegrating powers, terrorist activities, and regional conflict need intelligence that can view intensely and beyond outwardly obvious signs. The U.S. intelligence also lacks adequate expertise in order to have knowledge about social, political as well as economic changes of their targets.
Since the attacks on September 11th intensely affected the United States military’s capacity to depend on the priority support from the nationwide intelligence Community. Formerly, when the expected pressures were from overseas military forces, the armed forces were capable of assuming that their support was the state’s highest priority. Therefore, they could depend on the Intelligence Community centering its effort towards building systems to facilitate success during battlefield. One repercussion of the assurance of priority was organic military intelligence abilities and force structures were early and regular casualties of the search for a peaceful dividend.
The cyber threats barrier emerges as a consequence of the introduction of computer networks for communications. As a result, hostile groups and countries seek to disrupt vital infrastructures by having access to the technology required to pursue cyber attacks and cyber espionage. There are legal issues and difficult procedures that complicate the capability to discriminate foreign states from domestic cyber crimes. In relation to the current law and policy, cyber infringements are recognized as domestic in origin if not demonstrated otherwise. Therefore, this obstructs the participation of the United States Intelligence Community to detect and track cyber attacks.
Best Richard, “Intelligence information: Need to know vs Need to share”, Congressional research service (2011): 4-12.
Lieberthal Kenneth. “The U.S. Intelligence Community and foreign policy”, Getting analysis right journal (2009): 5-30.
Tama Jordan. “Intelligence Reform: Progress, remaining, deficiencies and nest steps”, The Princeton project on national security (2005): 1-20.
 Best Richard, “Intelligence information: Need to know vs Need to share”, Congressional research service (2011): 4-12.
 Lieberthal Kenneth. “The U.S. Intelligence Community and foreign policy”, Getting analysis right journal (2009): 5-30.
 Tama Jordan. “Intelligence Reform: Progress, remaining, deficiencies and nest steps”, The Princeton project on national security (2005): 1-20.