Ethics: Challenger Case Study
The Challenger Case study has been used over the years to
explore the area of ethics in the field of engineering. Through it, experts
have established that space discovery is a risky business and even in the best
of circumstances, things can still go wrong, with risky repercussions for the
bold men and women who project into this risky atmosphere. Nevertheless, the
incident of the Challenger may have had some preventable individual causes that
could have been prevented from become a catastrophe. The accident of the
Challenger is one with various ethical issues of concern. Even though there is
no one to fully take the blame on the activities and misfortunes that cost the
human life, the fact is that much could be done to prevent it from happening
especially due to the information that was available. This is especially
because a few people had foreseen the possibility of a crash following the
technical hitches that had been detected earlier. At the same time, it is
impossible for ethical people to settle on legitimate choices in the
utilization of innovations that consider as being of great dangers. People are
subjected to huge organizational pressure and demands. This paper makes an
analysis of the causes of the crash and the ethical implications encountered at
the time. It also gives recommendations.
The Challenger Case Study Overview
On the 28th day of January in 1986, seven outer-space men were killed when the space shuttle they were travelling in, the Challenger, blasted barely a moment after taking off. The failure of the strong rocket O-rings to remain fitted in its place permitted hot burning gases to break from the side and blaze through the fuel that was externally placed. The failure of the O-ring was ascribed to a few factors, including broken configuration of the strong rocket wings and the deficient low- temperature (Chapter IX, 2009).
It is worth pointing out the background that led to the launch of the challenger. The NASA chiefs were inspired to launch the Challenger for a few reasons, including monetary benefits that would come with it and the political mileages that would come with the launch. The unforeseen rivalry from the European Space Agency placed NASA under the pressure to launch the shuttle to demonstrate the US space prowess in space exploration system and for commercialization. This provoked NASA to outline a series of space missions in 1986 to put forth a defense for its plan demands.
The shuttle mission that had been organized before the Challenger had deferred had been affected by the harsh climate and mechanical components. Therefore, NASA needed to start the Challenger without any defers so the launch cushion could be renovated in time for the following mission, which might be convey a test that might analyze Halley’s Comet (Lara, 2010). Assuming that started on time, this test might have gathered information a couple of days before a comparable Russian test might be started. There was likely additionally pressure to start Challenger so it could be in space when President Reagan gave his State of the Union location. Reagan’s principle subject was to be training, and he was normal to mention the shuttle and the first educator in space, Christa Mcauliffe.
The Challenger incident struck the national mind like Sputnik. It was made all the more obvious, by the way, that such a variety of schoolchildren were viewing. It plunged the space program and space strategy into an immense emergency. Miserably, there were a few other launch failures that happened at about the same time. These included in April 1986; a Titan 34d at Vandenberg and in May, an NASA Delta rocket that was started into a rainstorm. The consequence was that all launch movement was grounded for a few years while the specialized issues were settled & while the space arrangement was balanced (Lara, 2010). The results of investing the country’s resources in one major project implied that the US had no dependable intends to get to space. The STS was grounded for 31 months and in that time space strategy was changed and the Air Force, business, worldwide and NASA groups repositioned themselves. Since no launches were accessible on US rockets, numerous business satellite foremen turned to Arianespace.
The US process of launching the Arianne took fundamentally more than half of the global market. The space strategy used by the Americans of denying the French an opportunity to utilize American rockets pushed them to create their own. Luckily, numerous satellites had been intended to fly on the Shuttle and the Ariane. After much consideration in the space arrangement team, it was agreed that the Shuttle would be utilized for national security missions and for exploratory missions where the human life was key. All business communication satellites were pushed off the Shuttle and advised to discover different strategies of operating in space.
The Challenger incident led to a prolonged 32-month rest in the shuttle program and the development of the Rogers Commission, an extraordinary requisition named by United States President Ronald Reagan to examine the mishap (Lara, 2010). The Rogers Commission found that NASA’s organizational society and decision making methodologies had contributed to the mishap. NASA supervisors had realized that contractor Morton Thiokol’s configuration of the SRBS held a conceivably cataclysmic imperfection in the O-rings since 1977, yet they neglected to address it appropriately and on time.
They further ignored the warnings from designers about the dangers of launching on such an icy day and had neglected a satisfactory report. The Rogers Commission offered NASA nine proposals that were to be actualized before shuttle flights continued. The immediate reason for the Challenger eruption was highlighted as defective O-rings. Nonetheless, the Challenger displayed a careful investigation in organizational communication and morals, including the ethics of organizational structure and the society as it contributes to correspondence, the morals of whistle blowing, and a phenomenal investigation of aggregation think.
1 Parties involved in the challenger case
|Party Involved||Role played|
|Marshall Space Flight Center||Was put to be the one in charge of the development of the booster rocket|
|Larry Mulley||Was the one who challenged the decision by engineering team convincing them not to launch the shuttle|
|Morton Thiokol||This was the company that NASA contracted to ensure the building of the rocket booster.|
|Alan McDonald||Alan was the director in charge of the rocket project|
|Bob Lund||Was the vice-president in charge of engineering at the time|
|Robert Ebeling||Was the engineer that was working under the leadership of McDonald|
|Roger Boisjoly||Was also an engineer working under the leadership of McDonald|
|Joe Kilminster||Was an engineer that served in a higher management position|
|Jerald Mason||Was serving as an senior executive at the time and motivated Lund to reconsider the initial decision of not launching the rocket|
2 Analysis of the ethical lapses that contributed to the engineering failure
The procedure of offering the American space and its political framework the requirement for reusable space transportation framework started in the late 1960’s. Reasonably, the Space Shuttle was presented throughout the peak of the successful Apollo mission. The Space Shuttle endorsed as a strategy for working without NASA’s sufficient knowledge of its operational objectives. This was regarded as the first technical hitch of the Challenger accident this implies that the shuttle was created as a utility without the firm’s provision. In addition to this, both the financial and political support were not exceptionally solid (Neuner, & Rider, 2010). This means that extra help needed by offering the Shuttle system to the military so as to build national security market the country globally as being technologically advanced. Researchers contended that the Shuttle would be the American source of pride with extraordinary logical increase. Comprehensively, the Shuttle was sold to enhance national and social relations by bringing together people and groups of diverse nationalities, races and genders who might serve as teams.
Although the demolition of the Shuttle Challenger was brought about by the failure of a robust rocket promoter (SRB) O- ring, the decision-making processes were also imperfect. To start with, the determination to start was based upon flawed aggregations, and further exasperated by the related blunder of that research.
The press reported that engineers at Morton Thiokol, the contractor answerable for building the robust rocket shuttle, had vivaciously restricted the launching of the Challenger, yet their cautioning had not been regarded by the NASA administration. These specialists suspected what the Rogers Commission later established that the instantaneous reason for the outburst was the failure in the joint O-rings – which engineers had been worried about for more than eight years before the launch.
In the examination that accompanied various helping components were recognized. To begin with, the NASA directors were under pressure to show that the STS were solid. They had commissioned the Challenger’s launch despite the fact that the temperature criteria were beyond the known operational extent of the STS. They overruled the engineers who cautioned of the conceivable threat. Approved NASA and Morton Thiokol designers had known for quite a while that there were issues with the gas blowby through the O-rings. Notwithstanding, the NASA framework, overlooked these signs. Third, the NASA correspondence framework by now was poor to the point that senior supervisors were unaware of these potential issues and the NASA manager despite any precedent to the contrary gave a go ahead for the launch. Subsequently the incredible R&D office, which had completed Apollo in a couple of years before was diminished to an operational organization.
Despite this concern, top NASA leaders especially those who were at the first and second levels confirmed before the Rogers Commission that they had no idea on the day before the crash that these matters had been the subject of serious contention within Thiokol and also between Thiokol and the Marshall Space Flight Center at the decision making levels. These authorities confirmed that they might not have given the last approbation to launch in the event that they had heard the perspectives of the Thiokol engineers (Texas A&M University, 1984). After a cautious investigation conducted to evaluate the potential causes of the Challenger accident, the Rogers Commission inferred that, despite the fact that the O-ring failure was the actual cause, other factors involving the decision making process were also to blame.
These elements point up issues of correspondence and ethics. A supportive network was evident and present between NASA and its related engineers of the Shuttle prior to the launch. On the night before the 27th, Thiokol was giving information to NASA with respect to concerns for the following day’s arranged launch of the STS 51-l. The Thiokol specialists were extremely worried that the unusual temperatures might influence the “O” rings to non-performance measures. The mission had been crossed out because of climate, and the extent that NASA was concerned; an alternate crossing out because of climate was incomprehensible. Both teams were at that point mindful of the need to replace or upgrade the SRB seals.
Though the information given by the GDSS (a co partnered master framework) demonstrated that said O-rings would have operated under the anticipated temperatures, Thiokol engineers addressed their own particular testing and information that were customized into the GDSS. This implies that NASA was fully informed on the night before the actual event and asked for a conclusive proposal from Thiokol. The NASA administration then reacted with pressure on Thiokol’s proposal to change their choice (Neuner, & Rider, 2010). Throughout this period, the Thiokol administration asked for the lead manager to take off his management calm stature and adapt to his administrative decision making role. This was with the intention that organizational objectives be considered prior to security contemplations.
NASA inquired as to whether there were whatever viable complaints from any possible GDSS part, and there being none, the launch was approved. Communication specialist Edward Tufte later established that the Challenger mischance can happen when information is presented to stakeholders in a careless manner. He contends that if Morton Thiokol designers had all the more plainly displayed the information that they had, then the situation would have been different (Baxter, 2014).
A critical point of concern at this point is in regards to what ethical steps the engineers take. To begin with is that they advised those in authority. After the issues with STS 15 in Jan 1985 and the two flight tickets in April, the Engineers were appropriately involved, and on 31, 1985, Boisjoly sent a memo to the Vice Chief executive of Technological innovation at Morton Thiokol directing out that if the blow-by issue of STS 17 were recurring in the area combined, the outcome would be a disaster. During the July/August period of time, NASA’s head office requested Morton Thiokol to get prepared with all the concerns that had been raised. NASA’s verdict was that despite the issues, the initially arranged flight launch plans would proceed. The issues were assessed as not so serious as to warranty a two-year delay in flight launch.
NASA was thus conscious of the complications and the Engineers realized there were issues. Therefore, when the Engineers collected together their maps to create their suggestions the evening before the Challenger launch, they went into the space to emphasize everyone in the sequence of control what everyone already realized. The maps were not new to anyone, and the details in them and the effects of those details were not new either.
3 Components of the ethical framework and what would have been done differently
Engineering has dependably been identified as a demanding profession in the recent years. In fact, engineering professional is progressively being included in new businesses in which they are required to make ethical decisions. Engineers should now consider moral issues that were previously considered as being the obligations of the business directors. Moreover, the fast development of biotechnology and e-business has made another moral scene in which designs must work (Pirate, 2010). The ethical perspective of engineers requires that they be taught about planning which is an imperative peace of the task.
Engineers are expected ethically to accomplish things right in their profession whenever they attempt for the first time, thus this explains the pressure under which the Challenger officials were experiencing. Another ethical measure that engineers are taught is that a sound configuration of the equipment and machines from the onset of the project often spares both time and money. Despite this, engineers must dedicate time to testing whatever machines have been designed before launching to ensure that the specifications are fulfilled.
In the event that the engineers of the Challenger considered that there was dishonesty involved in the process of decision making, then they had three fundamental options to consider, bearing in mind that they played their part: First, the engineers could decide to blow the whistle within the working team or to the relevant external parties involved. Secondly, they could decide to remain ethical by observing their deontological duties through resigning from the entire process and avoid dishonesty. The third option is to remain silent and do what the NASA bosses were demanding for so that the Challenger is eventually launched irrespective of the identified weaknesses.
Whistle blowing is an ethical issue of concern as it deals with the key issues of the engineering and other professions such as seeking to answer the following questions: What were the engineers’ obligations to their respective firms? What are the ethical codes of conduct for the engineering profession and how would their commitment to their job be different to the level of commitment from other team members from Thiokol who were on contractual basis? In spite of the fact that prudential issues must be recognized from moral ones, it was essential for the engineers to think precisely before acting like they did (Harris, Pritchard, & Rabins, 2009). The engineers who may have opted to due to the dishonest behavior should likewise think about their ethical obligations as worker of the firms. A critical issue of concern is whether NASA ought to have fired the engineers who carried on deceptively, or if it ought to attempt to redress the conduct and give them another opportunity.
There are various events, decision and activities that ought to have been put in place to make the situation different during the Challenger accident. To begin with is the communication framework. This could allow the specialists to speak to the NASA directors and initiate a free discussion on the applicable information because two autonomous teams are superior to one in terms of sharing knowledge (Baxter, 2014). Moreover, the engineers ought to have put much consideration in an issue where the stakes were so high such as the shuttle venture and the human lives that were eventually lost. Again, there is need for each engineer and directors or the management to comprehend what their main concerns were in line with the designing choices. The Challenger design process and launching plan had more financial implications thus the moral decision for the engineers involved would have been to separate oneself from the financial influences. This is an inquiry of qualities dependent upon trustworthiness, greatness and proper administration.
The information launch option was created in the middle of a new and significant threat, of which the team was kept unaware. The procedure to cope with limited lack of knowledge in and to avoid a lock-in into a negative situation with all associated with risks would have involved the following: (1) corrigibility of choices, (2) choose systems that are easy to control, (3) versatility of the options available, (4) insensitivity of the option to error. Boisjoly was adamant that the leader of the Challenger would never intentionally have taken such a threat (McDonald & Hansen, 2009).
A critical question is on whether Lund should have changed himself and accepted the launch. It seems apparent that he should not have. There is need to question further whether Lund should have accepted the release of the shuttle into space given only the details actually available. It appears that Lund had a change of mind and accepted the launch because he started to think like an administrator rather than a professional, there is need to distinguish the role of a manager and a professional in times of crisis.
The materials used in the production of the O-rings were also crucial to the security function of the system. The O-rings had to be functional at the excellent temperature ranges in the mixed, which would outcome from warm exchange from the bomb burning stage. However, the use of NBR insulating material around the propellant, and the use of putty, was to secure the metal supports and the O-rings from the immediate warm of the propellant fumes. This protection was not always successful when blowholes in the putty happened, however, and the O-rings would regularly be broken by warm. The lower temperature ranges that happen in California during the winter season was not protected by NASA’s specifications
Information of the distinction would stress technological details. While organizational leaders and managers are qualified to cope with individuals, engineers are qualified to cope with machines and things (Harris, Pritchard, & Rabins, 2009). To think like an administrator rather than a professional is to focus on individuals instead of putting much emphasis on things. In line with this information available, Lund was requested to issue himself mainly with how best to cope with his senior bosses and colleagues. Ethically, it was expected of him to use his ability of technological innovation to help him know what his engineers were saying.
Whereas the engineers were involved about the protection of the Challenger, and especially the O-ring, the managers are represented as having created a purposeful option to take the chance of catastrophe in the mild of other passions with regards to cash and popularity (McNeese, 2003). The professional would be under remarkable stress to keep her personal opinions to herself in order to peacefully proceed with the job. Vaughan (1996) observes that this is an incorrect presentation of what actually happened. In her view, the option to launch the Challenger should be seen in the mild of a design of previously, partially implied, choices in which the presentation of what was officially happening when O-rings worn away on previously flight tickets and what was still an `acceptable risk’ had moved. The option to launch the Challenger on the evening before the crucial catastrophe fixed into this design, although once again it was a reinterpretation, and expanding, of what was still an appropriate threat. In Vaughan’s studying, both the managers and engineers engaged considered of the O-rings as an appropriate threat on the nights the launch option (and some of the managers still considered they created the right option after the fact).
The way Vaughan explains the Challenger launch option can be seen as a representation of a trend known as `organizational deviance’: standards that are seen as deviant or illegal outside the company are seen within the company as normal and genuine. Actually, many outside the company considered with hindsight that the Challenger never should have been launched, while the option to do so fixed many of the implied standards and recommendations that had progressed within the company (Bredeson, 1999).
The exciting factor is that Vaughan’s information also makes obvious how this business deviance comes about. The purpose was not that NASA did not proper worry about safety; in reality, protection issues are important within the company, and NASA has tried to create a variety of business techniques to protect protection. The deviance rather came about as caused by a design of step-by-step and partially implied choices based on the O-rings; it was this variety of choices that led to what is known as the `normalization of deviance. Every company must have main power and decentralized working models. Finding the appropriate balance between those parts and guaranteeing real interaction among them is a main process of business lifestyle. When engineers at NASA tried to create their protection issues known to objective control, they were ignored or overridden.
They may have too quickly discontinued their liability for protection and acquiesced to control specifications. On its side, control placed other main concerns before objective protection specifications and rejected to pay attention to the very individuals whom NASA predicted to offer professional consultancy. Key prominent questions arise at this stage such as; why should engineers be so involved about the details of their rule when, it seems, community identifies technological innovation as a career and does not much proper care which of the various specifications engineers adopt? Why did the unique technological innovation specifications take so much space resting down recommendations about how engineers should cure one another when it seems community is likely not to proper worry about such factors or (as in the prohibition of supplanting another engineer) to be favorably adverse? The lack of ability of the second information to help us respond to such critical questions indicates that the need for alternative options.
Thirdly, information regarding a career may thus be derived from the set code of conduct that outlines the rules and regulations. A code of ethics defends associates of a career from certain repercussions of competitors. This implies that a profession may not require the approval of the society to be determined as a career. It needs only an exercise among its associates of participating to offer a certain perfect. Once a profession has become a career expert in the community, he has a duty to provide it with special rights. The community, Baxter (2014) observed, may back him up by providing the perfect working environment that enables him to uphold his ethics (Baxter, 2014). If we comprehend a rule of values as the way a career explains interaction between those who want to offer a typical perfect, we may construe the variety of different specifications of values as displaying that engineers are not yet completely decided to how they want to engage in their typical perfect. Engineering would, in this regard, still be a profession-in-the-making.
Considering technological innovation in this way is, under the circumstances, however reliable with considering of technological innovation as a career. The purposeful variations between specifications are not excellent (Bredeson, 1999). The variations in framework and terminology are more apparent than important in the option of performance. Engineers seem to have decided on all important circumstances of their contract. Understanding a rule of values as an agreement between experts, it is possible to describe why engineers should not rely on simple private moral sense when selecting how to exercise their career and why they should take into consideration their company orders. What others anticipate of us is an aspect of what we should take into consideration in selecting what to do, especially if the anticipations are affordable. The stipulated codes of professional conduct for engineers’ outlines what engineers expect of one another.
It is excellent technological innovation exercise to style items to offer production pedaling abilities and methods. Furthermore, with the clevis experiencing up and the tang down, field set up at the Kennedy Area Middle was simple. Along with the extra 0-ring, the style change showed up affordable. However, it is also excellent technological innovation exercise to offer all the causes and circumstances that the item must performance under during its useful lifestyle. The style of the Shuttle Strong Rocket Engine, in contrast to the Powerhouse, had to offer for recycling of the propellant supports, such as the dressed in of mixed areas and distortions of the situation in managing and shipping. It had to offer bulkier propellant plenty. The style was more vulnerable to water access during stormy weather. In addition, most significant, the style had to offer a mixture of powerful architectural plenty considerably different from those experienced by the Powerhouse. It is always readily available error with another individual’s work; especially after a car incident happens. It is quite another matter to develop the performance and generate a useful item.
The mixed style provided an immediate direction between the burning stage, made up of an annulus with propellant around it, and the outside of the metal motor supports. That direction was enclosed with putty and two round fluorocarbon elastomer (rubber-like) groups known as O-rings. While O-rings are regularly used to maintain specifications much higher than those existing in the Strong Rocket Engine, heat and architectural cause’s performance on the joint parts are powerful. These joint parts must carry and exchange these plenty between the supports. Another important component of excellent technological innovation exercise is to use material designed for the function. Some O-rings can hold up against excellent temperatures.
Space discovery is a risky business. Even in the best of circumstances, factors can go incorrect, with risky repercussions for the bold men and women who project into this risky atmosphere. Nevertheless, the incident of the place shuttle Mexico may have had some preventable individual causes that converted what could have been a survivable incident into a catastrophe. The accident of the Challenger is one with various ethical issues of concern. Even though there is no one to fully take the blame on the activities and misfortunes that cost the human life, the fact is that much could be done to prevent it from happening especially due to the information that was available. This is especially because a few people had foreseen the possibility of a crash following the technical hitches that had been detected earlier. At the same time, it is impossible for ethical people to settle on legitimate choices in the utilization of innovations that consider as being of great dangers. People are subjected to huge organizational pressure and demands.
A mixture of external controls and screening components must be utilized to minimize the probability of future space accidents. After the Challenger mishap, further shuttle flights were suspended by NASA, pending the outcomes of the Rogers Commission examination. Although NASA had held an interior analysis into the Apollo 1 flame in 1967, its movements after Challenger were more compelled by the judgments of external recommendations. The Rogers Commission offered nine proposals on enhancing security in the space shuttle project, and NASA was controlled by President Reagan to report once again in a timeline of thirty days concerning how it wanted to actualize those suggestions. According to the requisition’s suggestion, NASA started an aggregate update of the space shuttle’s strong rocket promoters, which was viewed over by an autonomous oversight gather as stipulated by the requisition.
5 Recommendations for actions
Characterizing these steps should offer recommendations for nearing other problems of technological innovation values.
Recognizing the ethical and moral issues is the first recommendation for engineers. Not all technological innovation choices have an ethical sizing. One useful analyze is to ask whether anyone but the professional in query would experience or be put at threat by the performance in query. Another is to ask whether the professional would like a globe in which most engineers performances themselves as the professional is thinking about. A third strategy is to ask whether the professional would want what he is doing to be commonly known. The first analyze tends to pick out problems of individual welfare; the second, problems of fairness; and the third, problems of loyalty. These assessments must, of course, be used using all appropriate details available and only details available. We should not neglect unwanted information or cure simple opportunities as if they were more than that. Details are appropriate if it might impact a logical individual’s option. It is available if the decision-maker has it or can easily get it soon enough to choose.
Differentiating personal problems from the professional ethics is also highly recommended for engineers. Should any of the above assessments provide a positive outcome, the next step is to consider what kind of ethical issue has been recognized. Worth noting is that not all ethical problems are professional problems. One sign that professional values are engaged is that the performance is particularly mentioned in a rule of technological innovation values. But, not all issues of professional values are particularly mentioned in values specifications. Lund’s performance brought up a query of technological innovation values because it engaged using details of technological innovation or using some power he had (in part) because he was a professional.
Come up with relevant choices is also recommended for engineers. Often, however, the initial list of options will be imperfect in an important way. (Perhaps, for example, had Lund recommended it, Lund’s manager would have been only too happy to brief the jet pilots on the O-ring threat and let them choose whether to delay lift-off.) Not all ethical problems are as difficult as they seem at first (though many are as difficult or harder). Therefore, it is worth asking whether any serious options have been left out. One source of options is a rule of values, especially if it is as specific as the NSPE. Other resources are biographies of engineers, situation studies of particular technological innovation problems, and creative stories about engineers in ethical problems. These can, of course, only be used if there is time to make reference to them–or if one has read them in advance.
Assess and evaluating the existing choices is also highly recommended. There are two opportunities. Sometimes the appropriate rule of values, especially a specific one like the NSPE’s will contain a supply, which particularly declares that one of the variety of choices available is expertly needed. When the appropriate rule is on point, the expertly proper option is obvious. More often, circumstances will have to be considered to determine what the rule needs. Interpretation needs a) identifying all potentially appropriate circumstances of the rule, b) trying to create them fit together so that they provide recommendations a logical professional would want every other professional to adhere to even if that means having to adhere to them too, and c) identifying what those recommendations need in the situation in query.
Any wrong summary would have to rest on a presentation of the rule. In common, however, it is irrational to assume engineers would need associates of their career to do anything wrong. What then is a professional to do when she faces a truly difficult case? The response seems apparent. Morally bad activities are rarely all equivalent. Some may be less dangerous, less unjust, or less unethical, than others. In circumstances enabling no fairly right action, and professional could still keep the community attention vital, maintain the reliability of her career, and the like by doing the least damage possible, by being as reasonable as possible, and by otherwise keeping wrongdoing to a lowest. That certainly seems to be how each logical professional would want others to performance themselves. Any rule of values should be considered accordingly.
Deciding what to do in this way should always generate performance logical engineers would assistance as a common exercise, since each professional appears to advantage if other engineers usually choose on performance in this way. Just as important perhaps, identifying in this way should also generate performance of which the community would accept, since it appears to advantage from the useful items of technological innovation without compromise of its protection, wellness, or well-being. Therefore, a professional who selects professional performance in this way should be able to persuade any logical individual involved, to promote his concepts and his considering. He should, in other words, be completely able to rationalize his performance.
of the decisions made and options available is also recommended. Having thus
achieved a preliminary response, an engineer ought to look at opinions. One way
to do that is to think about an engineer on a “board of ethical review. No
validation of performance is expertly defensible if it entices an engineer is
mostly reliant on passions an engineer do not share with engineers usually or
with the community. Putting thyself in the place of the career or the community
is an excellent way to think impartially.
Another way to capture mistakes is to put the issue to engineers not
engaged in it, especially those with experience and popularity for excellent
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